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Safely Learning Optimal Auctions: A Testable Learning Framework for Mechanism Design
We design a new Regularized Testable Learning framework for mechanism design and show how it can be used to determine when important …
Vikram Kher, Manolis Zampetakis
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Proportional Representation in Metric Spaces and Low-Distortion Committee Selection
We propose and analyze a natural new definition for when a small set R of k points in a metric space is representative of a larger set.
Yusuf Hakan Kalayci, David Kempe, Vikram Kher
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Fine-Grained Buy-Many Mechanisms Are Not Much Better Than Bundling
We introduce a new parameterized class of mechanisms, buy-k mechanisms, which smoothly interpolate between the classical buy-one …
Sepehr Assadi, Vikram Kher, George Li, Ariel Schvartzman
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